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THE ELEMENTS OF. THE 
'ACTIO MANUTENTIONIS', 
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THIS 
ACTION AVAILABLE ALSO TO 
MERE DETENTORS? 
··.PAUL DEBONO
The 'actio manutentionis' is one of the four 'actiones possessori.ae' which 
defend and protect possession both if it is joined and if it is separate from the 
right, defending possession against any person, and even against the owner 
himself. The rational basis behind them is the necessity of forbidding violence 
and arbitrary molestations against the possessor, and also in protecting public 
order· where no one can take the law into one's own hands. This nature of 
public order was enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Muscat versus Farrugia 
(1956) - Volume XL.11.897, where the possessory action is founded on the 
necessity of social utility, rather than any absolute principle of justice, to prevent 
the private citizen from taking justice into his hands. In fact Galgano says: 
"Si sogliono addurre, per giustificare questa protezione, superiore 
esigenze attinenti all'ordine pubblico: se chiunque potesse liberamente 
impossessarsi di c;io che altri possiede senza esserne (o senza poter provare 
di esserne) proprietario, si legittimerebbero spoliazioni a catena, e l'ordine 
pubblico ne sarebbe gravemente pregiudicato". The inherent limitations 
in these possessory actions, being restricted to molestations and aggressions 
of possession, distinguish them.from the 'actionis petitoriae' which can· be 
exercised by persons havingJhe right of ownership or other real rights over 
the thing against a usurper/In Ersilia Zahra versus Aurelia Carabott (1955) 
- Volume XXXIX.1.315, the Court of Appeal said that in the possessory
_judgement, it is only the 'jus possessionis' that is decided upon, and not the
·_jus possedendi', without prejudice to the issue in the substantive actions.
The action for the maintenance of possession, together with the 'actio spolii' 
can be said to be the real possessory actions, because they can be exercised 
only by the possessor, who may be the owner, whereas the other two can be 
exercised also by the owner even if he is not the actual possessor. In Italy, 
the position seems to be similar where Galgano says: 
"Le azioni possessorie spettano al possessore, anche se non 
proprietario, ma di esse puo avvalersi, e normalmente si avvale, anche ii 
proprietario, che sia stato spogliato del possesso o molestato nel godimento 
del bene. In tal caso egli non agisce come proprietario ma cQme possessore; 
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e le azioni possessorie gli offrono una protezione assai piu rapida di quella 
che otterrebbe con le azioni petitorie, essendo dispensato dall'onere della 
prova, spesso difficile, della proprieta del bene''. 
Section 534 defines the actio manutentionis as: 
''Where any person, being in possession, of whatever kind, of an 
immovable thing, or of a universitas of movables, is molested in such 
possession, he may, within one year from the molestation, demand that 
his possession be retained, provided he shall not have usurped such 
possession from the defendant by violence or clandestinely, nor obtained 
it from him precariously''. 
This is a derivation from the 'interdictum uti possidetis' under Roman 
Law, where the plai11tiff, being the molested possessor, exercises the action 
against the �efendant who is the person causing the molestation. In France 
it is known as the complaint. The eleµients of this action may be said to be 
the conditions under which it can be exercised The 1st element is: 
Being in Possession, of whatever kind 
Possession is defined in Section 524 ( 1) as, "the detention of a corporeal 
thing or the enjoyment of a right, the ownership of which may be acquired, 
and which a person holds or exercises as his own". The operative part is
the latter, where one is not merely detaining, but possessing in terms of law 
as will be subsequently shown. Possession is a state offact which is recognized 
and protected by law, inspite of its not being a right. We find its genesis in 
Roman Law where the praetor, in case of conflict as to who was in possession, 
issued the possessory interdict 'uti possidetis - vi. clam. precario ad 
adversario'. The person now in possession should not be molested unless he 
has gone into occupation through violence by any unlawful act, clandestinely, 
or by precarious title vis-a-vis his adversary, that is, as between the parties 
to the action. 
The elements of possession are the material element, corpus, the fact, and
the mental element, the animus, the intent. Savigny's subjective theory
postulates the animus domini, the intent of holding as owner. Ihering' s
objective theory does not postulate such a high intent, it is merely that of keeping 
the thing to oneself to the exclusion of others, hence deriving its economic utility, 
provided there is no negative element. 
Savigny - Possession
Detention 
Ihering - Possession 
Detention 
Corpus + Animus 
Corpus + Animus detenendi 
Corpus + Animus 
Corpus + Animus - negative element 
Under the objective theory, both possession and detention have the same 
animus, but there exists the negative element in detention. This latter view 
seems to be closer to the Roman Law approach especially in protecting the 
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possession of the motive property devolving on the children born of a 
matrimonium liberum. As they were not her agnates, they could not inherit 
her, yet the praetor protected their possession. From the definition of possession 
under Section 524 (1), it seems that our law is closer to Ihering's approach. 
In his Fonte, Sir Adrian Dingli did not adopt the Italian concept because it 
applied to legitimate possession which was only necessary for prescription and 
because detention and possession were confused: 
''Confondono la detenzione col possesso, ii cui carettere principale 
e quello di tenere la cosa come propria". 
Possession of whatever kind implies legitimate, illegitimate, in good faith 
and in bad faith. In Azzopardi versus Farrugia (1930) Volume 
XXVII.1.622, the Court of Appeal confirmed that:
"La differenza fra le due azione, e marcato, mentre quella di 
manutenzione e data per proteggerejl possesso che possa essere turbato, 
ed anche eventualmente violato o distrutto, l'altro di reintegrazione viene 
fondata nel punire la violenza o la dandestinita dello spoglio'' .... '' 11 nostro· 
legislatore, concede l'azione di manuntenzione a qualunque possessore, sia 
esso legittimo o illegittimo, di buona o male fede, purche pero la 
illegittimita, cioe la violenza, la clandestinita. e la precarieta., non sia stata 
operata contro il convenuto, ii quale deve essere difeso come contro un 
ingiusto spogliatore''. 
Possession is legitimate if the elements of iusta causa usucapionis exist 
- Section 2107 (1): Civil Code:
Continuous, when the possessor has not willingly desisted fro·m exercising
acts of possession to which the thing is subject according to its kind. Thus, 
there has been no act of omission; 
Uninterrupted, when not given up through an act either of the possessor 
himself or of a third party. There can be civil interruption by the possessor 
himself by acknowledging a right of ownership in another person, or natural 
or civil acts by a third party or by the owner. Natural interruption would be 
deprivation of possession for a term exceeding one year (Section 2127) whereas 
civil interruptions are measures laid down under Section 2128 to Section 2132 
in favour of the owner to protect his right against prescription. If these acts 
are performed by a non-owner, possession remains uninterrupted. 
Peaceful and Public,· when possession has been acquired without physical 
or moral violence and by means of visible acts. These 'uitia' are relative to 
the person suffering them, because in terms of Section 527, initial violence and 
clandestinity do not perpetually nitiate possession as it can be recommenced 
when they have ceased. 
Unequivocal. Possession is equivocal when through the conduct of the 
possessor and other circumstances, it is not clear that the possessor detains the 
thing as his own. In terms of Section 526, equivocal possession results also 
from the exercise of facultative rights or based on tolerance. Equivocal title 
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implies also a precarious title being relative to the person by whom possession 
has been so obtained. It is a permanent vitiation because it is to be found at 
all times. Any vitiation in any of the elements renders possession illegitim.ate 
and in certain instances turns it into detention or holding thus important with 
reference to the time required for prescription and also as regards the exercise 
of certain posses�ory actions. 
It is a question of fact as to whether possession is in good faith or bad 
faith, but under Section 532, good faith is presumed, and the party alleging 
bad faith is bound to prove it. Good faith means the conviction, justified by 
probable grounds, which the possessor has, that the thing possessed by him 
is his or that the right which he exercises belongs to him. Section 531 ( 1) says 
that a person who, on probable grounds, believes that the thing he possesses 
is his own, is a possessor in good faith. A possessor in bad faith is the person 
who knows or who ought, from circumstances, to presume that the thing or 
right possessed by him, belongs to oth�r·s - Section 531 (2). The legitimacy 
of possession is here qot affected, it only affects the rights and obligations 
between the- possessor and the owner and· the time necessary for prescription 
- (Section 2140 - Section 2142).
In terms of what has been said above, it therefore appears that only the
possessor, admittedly of whatever kind, can exercise the actio manutentionis, 
but in terms of the wording in 8004, there appears to be an inherent conflict 
because it depends on who the defendant is. In fact Section 534 continues, 
''provided that he shall not have usurped such· possession from the 
defendant by violence or clandestinely nor obtained it from him 
precariously". This indicated the defences available to the defendant, however, 
the problem that arises is that it appears that in certain instances, where the 
above vitia do not exist vis-a-vis the defendant, simple holders or detentors 
may also exercise the actio manutentionis. 
What does a precarious title mean? Does it mean precarium, that is, 
holding gratuitously at the pleasure of the owner, or does it mean also holding 
or detaining onerously or gratuitously in the name of another? In both instances, 
there is no possession as there is the negative element, or absence of animus. 
Indeed, the lessor may be an indirect possessor because he is holding through 
the lessee who, in terms of Section 524 (3) is a mere holder. If a person has 
begun to hold the thing in the name of another person, he cannot, in terms 
of Section 525 (2) detain in a different way, for the simple reason that he wishes 
so to do. In fact Section 525 (2) states that where a person has commenced 
his possession in the name of another person, he shall be presumed to possess 
upon the same title unless the contrary be proved. 
It therefore appears that "possession of whatever kind",. implies that 
precarious holders, detentors or holders do not fall within the legal meaning 
thereof, and therefore cannot exercise the actio manutentionis. Section 2118 
as regards prescription states that persons who hold a thing in the name of· 
others or the heirs of such persons, cannot prescribe in their own favour, such 
are tenants, depositaries, usufructuaries and generally, persons who hold the 
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-thing not as their own. There are only three exceptions to the principle of the
indelibility of the vitiation of precarium, or of detention found under Section
2119 and Section 2120 under the title of prescription.
These are:
(a) When the cause of the detention is changed by virtue of an exterior
act of a third party, who transfers to the holder of the thing, the property thereof. 
(b) When the cause of detention is changed by virtue of extfrior
oppositions made by the holder himself against the right of the owner. In this 
respect, Torrente says: 
"Per mutare la detenzione in possesso e necessario un atto di 
opposizione contro ii possessore; atto che, comunque esplicato, deve 
inequivocabilmente manifestare l'intenzione di tenere la cosa per proprio 
conto esclusivo''. 
This was also confirmed by the C�>rte · di Cassazione in Italy in 1954. 
( c) When the person who formerly held the thing in the name of another ·
person alienates it in favour of a third party in virtue of a particular title capable 
of transferring ownership. 
Dingli himself, commenting on his inclusion of the phrase under Section 
2118 "who hold a thing in the name of others", said that he did not use 
the words "holding precariously" because "secondo la giurisprudenza 
Francese, queste parole significano ogni detenzione in nomi altrui, mentre 
secondo le nostre idee tolte dal diritto Romano, significano soltanto una 
detenzione a piacere del proprietario ". It therefore appears th.at the word 
'precariously' under Section 534 has a very restricted meaning, that is, solely 
as defined under Section 1839. 
Taking the above as a starting point, 'precarium' can never found 
possession, because there is absence of animus and the negative element. 
Furthermore, although lease which is usually onerous, usufruct and other titles 
do not fall under the definition of 'precarium', yet due to the definition and 
presumptions of possession, they are not possessors as they liold in the name 
of others, which is of widei: application. This was confirmed in Azzopardi 
versus Farrugia (1962) - Volume XLVI.1.381 where the Court held: 
"Huma skond id-dritt modern, possessuri prelearji dawk Ii jkunu 
jgawdu minn xi dritt, anke ta' natura rrevokabbli, Ii ma jirrivertax 
assolutament lill-proprjetarju imma jimmantjenu fih id-dritt u Ii 
1-possessuri jridu bil-fors jirrispettaw".
In Appeal it was also held that even the emphyteuta and the usufructuary 
are precarious possessors but only as regards the rights of the direct and the 
bare owner respectively. 
It is here where the inherent conflict appears. Section 534 starts by saying 
that only possessors. of whatever kind can exercise the 'actio' yet its proviso 
states that the 'iritium' of precariousness shall operate only if the possessor, 
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being the plaintiff, had usurped possession from the defendant. The 
presumption under Section 525 (2) that one who has commenced his possession 
in the name of another person shall be presumed always to possess under the 
same title unless the contrary be proved, and the rule under Section 2121 ( 1) 
that no one can change in regard to himself the cause for which he holds the 
thing, reinforce the view that a detentor or holder always remajn so. In Grixti 
v·ersus Ellul (1939) - Volume XXX.1.457 the Court of Appeal in this context 
said that it is evident that those who, as the usufructuary, hold precariously 
in the name of another, for the purpose of their precarious rights, it would 
be immoral, if insciente domino, they would invert their title and possess 
'animo domini'. Zachar quoted in Dingli's Fonti says: 
"La clandestinita e la violenza devono essere riguardo al convenuto 
per escludere l'azione possessoria, ma la precarita e un vizio generale ed 
esclude sempre l'azione, anchorche l'attore abbia. avuto la cosa 
precariamente da un terzo''. 
This reasoning seems to be similar to Italian Law except for one exception 
where Galgano states: 
"Per regola generate, al detentore non spetta invece l'azion� di 
manutenzione, percio ii detentore dovra rivolgersi al possessore perche sia 
lui ad esercitare l'azione di manutenzione, se ha subito uno spoglio non 
violento o clandestino o see stato solo �olestato nella detenzione. La regola 
generate trova pero una importante eccezione: il conduttore che sia stato 
da terzi molestato nel godimento della cosa puo esercitare egli stesso l' azione 
di manutenzione, senza bisogno di rivolgersi al locatore". 
Carbonnier is of the same opinion, "enfin, le principe est qu'il ne peut 
(en matiere immobiliere) escercer les actions possessoires". He continues 
that vis-a-vis the owner or from whom he holds precariously, the detentor does 
not need this possessory action because he is already adequately protected under 
the criminal code as regards violation of one's domicile or forced entrance and 
also by the terms of his own contract. With regard to molestation by a' third 
party, the detentor can denounce to the owner / possessor, who may then in 
turn exercise the complaint. However, in certain instances, Carbonnier says 
that one can sometimes come across clauses where certain detentors are 
delegated with the power of making the complaint in the name of the possessor. 
In so far as local jurisprudence is concerned, there have been cases where 
our courts have expressed their opinion that detentors cannot exercise the Actio 
Manutentionis. In Azzopardi versus Farrugia (1930) Volume 
XXVIl.1.622 plaintiff was a tenant of some enclosed tenement, but he used 
to exercise a right of way over defendant's fields. The First Court held: 
'' L 'azione possessoria non compete che all possessore di un fondo che 
tiene per se ed in suo nome, e non compete al conduttore che tiene la cosa 
non per se, ma in nome di altri, e quindi l'attore, che e conduttore, non 
puo invocare in suo favore la disposizione di detto Art 229 (S 534) ..... 
La disposizione applicabile sarebbe · quella contenuta nell' Articolo 
230 (S 535)". 
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In Appeal, besides confirming the above, it was held that had the legislator 
wanted to include also detentors under Section 534, he could have included 
also the words "or of the detention" which are found under Section 535. 
"Non intende riferirsi al possesso di fatto, ma solamente di diritto". 
The above line of argument was also followed in Mamo versus Camilleri 
(1962) - Volume XLVI.162 besides others. Here the Court of Appeal held 
that the action exercised by plaintiff was not the actio manutentionis, "ghas­
semplici raguni illi 1-attur hu hiss kerrej tal-fond, cioe semplici detentur, 
mentri dik 1-azzjoni tikkompeti hiss Iii min hu possessur fis-sens veru tal­
Artikolu 561 (1) (Now 524 (1)) 11. The court gave the plaintiff an alternative 
remedy only because he left a discretion to the court so to do. Had plaintiff 
exercised the actio manutentionis only, the court. would have thrown o�t his 
case. 
From all the above, it therefore appears that before entering into the merits 
of the molestation to grant a remedy, the court must first enter into an 
examination as to whether the plaintiff is a possessor or not. However, in a 
1967 judgment, Vella versus Boldarini et - Volume LI.1.100 in my opinion, 
the Court of Appeal seems to have disregarded the above arguments and 
concentrated its findings on the proviso to Section 534 which has created a 
contradiction to what has been said before. 
Plaintiff used to receive a percentage of rent on some premises in Senglea, 
but defendants unilaterally contested this right and therefore stopped paying 
her. Although defendants pleaded the precariousness of plaintiff's possession, 
because only her husband was the administrator, the court in refusing this line 
of argument, said that ius terzi cannot be pleaded. Quoting from a very early 
judgment (IX.291) it said: 
"Non e lecito a chiunque, benche munito di un titolo di proprieta 
di molestare il possessore di un immobile anche con titolo precario, a meno 
che I' attore non metta per base della sua istanza la domanda da provarsi 
di essere egli ii proprietario della casa da altri posseduta''. 
In deciding in favour of plaintiff, the court did not go into the merits of 
what type of possession she had, and interrupted the legal position that the 
actio manutentionis cannot be exercised only if any of the 'vitia' already 
mentioned, exist vis-a-vis the defendant: 
"11-vizzju tal-prekarjeta jeskludi 1-azzjoni hiss meta jkun rigward il­
konvenut u dan jirrizulta car mill-kliem minn ghandu" (nor obtained it 
from him precariously). 
To strengthen its reasoning, the court also quoted Sir A. Dingli in having 
suppressed the word 'legitimate' from the definition of possession, however, 
in my opinion, it appears that he was quoted wrongly, because 'legitimate' 
"as not included for reasons already cited as regards the prescriptive period 
required. Admittedly, pleas of ownership are excluded in possessory actions, 
as their object is to maintain the status quo, but, in my opinion, the proviso 
to Sert ion 534 should be read in the context of the whole section, and not on 
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its own. Therefore it appears that the court should have entered into the merits 
as to whether the plaintiff was a possessor or not. 
There seemed to be a hint on the same line of reasoning in Agius versus 
Cutajar (1959) - Volume XLIIl.1.97. Plaintiff was the owner and possessor 
of an alley in Zabbar and was molested by defendant. The Court of Appeal 
held that: 
"Peress illi 1-prova ta' dan I-element tmiss lill-attrici, I-appellant 
issostni illi huma ma ppruvawx ebda element ta' pussess fuq 1-isqaq in 
kwistjoni. Iida din il-pretenzjoni mhix gustifikata. Appena hemm bzonn 
jinghad illi anki jekk dan il-pussess tal-attrici kien komuni, huwa kien 
1-istess manutenibbli galadarba 1-konvenuta permezz tal-mandatarju tieghu 
menomat 1-ezercizzju tieghu b'att ta' molestija". 
One may perhaps reconcile the apparent contradiction that, in spite 'of 
perhaps being able to exercise this possessory action, the detentor or holder 
only do so inthe name of the· possessor. In fact Section 524 (1) says �hat, "a 
person may possess by means of another who holds the thing or exercises 
the right in the name of such person". Nonetheless, as our courts are not 
bound by the doctrine of precedent, it still remains to be seen whether the 
argument posed in Vella versus Boldarini will be upheld in the future. 
On the other hand, the actio spolii is granted also to the simple holder, 
even if the defendant is the owner of the thing which the plaintiff has been 
given under a precarious title, or whose possession is vitiated through violence 
or clandestinity. Except for dilatory pleas, the defendai:it, unlike under the actio 
manutentionis, cannot plead any of the above mentioned 'vitia'. In Falzon 
versus Bonello et (1916) - Volume XXIII.11.82, the court held: 
"Nelle cause di spoglio l'esame della corte deve versare semplicimente 
sul fatto del possesso, o della detenzione, alla quale la legge estende anche 
l'azione di spoglio o dello spoglio, ed al convenuto spogliante none lecito 
allegare alcun eccezione che non fosse dilatorio, prima di avere reintegrato 
nel suo possesso, lo spogliato''. 
This was confirmed in Appeal a year later (Volume XXIIl.1.366). 
Influenced by Canon Law, "spoliatus ante omnia restituendus", where 
there must first be reintegration of the possessor or detentor with the thing, 
and it is only after the court order is obeyed that the owner is then allowed 
to commen�e the actio manutentionis provided the elements exist (Section 536), 
or an 'actio petitoria', to prove his right over the thing. Section 532 (2) in fact 
states: 
'' Such reinstatement shall be ordered by the court even though the 
defendant be the owner of the thing of which the plaintiff has been 
despoiled''. 
As was upheld in Vella versus Boldarini, the court expelled from the 
records of the case, questions of ownership produced by the defendant that 
the plaintiff was not the owner. Ownership is therefore irrelevant because the 
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possessory remedies are limited to the aspect of possession, subject to the proviso 
mentioned by me as regards possession under the actio manutentionis. In this 
regard, Galgano says: 
"II convenuto nel giudizio possessorio non puo difendersi eccependo 
di essere ii proprietario della cosa: ne puo iniziare ii giudizio petitorio finche 
ii giudizio possessorio non sia stato definito e la decizione. non sia stata 
eseguita. La ragione del divieto e evidente: ii proprietario, che sia stato 
privato del possesso della cosa, ha tutto ii diritto di riottenerlo, ma deve, 
per realizzare questo risultato, esercitare in giudizio quella opposita azione 
che e l'azione di rivendicazione, e deve attendere la sentenza che, accertato 
ii suo diritto di proprieta, ordini al possessore di restituirgli la cosa". 
The second element of the actio manutentionis is that the subject matter 
must be either an immovable, corporeal or incorporeal or a universality 
of movables as for example a herd. This is one of the divergencies from the 
actio spolii because the latter is of a wider application as it can be exercised. 
in case of spoliation of whatever kind, whether of an immovable or a moveable 
thing. This reveals that the actio manutentionis cannot be exercised in respect 
of particular moveables, as confirmed in Gauci Forno versus Gravina (1931) 
Volume XXVIIl.1.188 where the court held: 
"Traendo l'azione di manutenzione ..... essendo cosi un azione reali 
e non accordata per i casi di turbativa nel possesso di cose mobili che non 
costituiscono una universalita di mobili". 
As regards this element, Sir A. Dingli did not include "diritti reale" 
with immovables as it was then in Italy e.g. usufruct, usus and praedeal 
easements, because these are already included under the definition of 
immovables found under Section 310 .. "Universalita di mobili" was adopted 
from France (Pothier) such as "eredita di mobili, un fondo di commercio", 
however in this regards Torrente raises an interesting point on the business 
concern. He says that the actio manutentionis does not apply to the business 
concern because the universality of movables, as defined in the Italian Code, 
must be of the same genus and must belong to the same person. The complexity 
of the goodwill belonging to the business concern does not have the nature of 
a res and therefore the subject matter of a possessory action, ''non ha tuttavia 
natura di res, suscettibile di formare oggetto di un diritto reale, o di una 
corrispondente tutela possessoria, nel caso di suiamento o di concorrenza 
sleale". The Corte di Cassazione in Italy has agreed to this proposition. 
The third element is the Molestation. The possessor must have been 
molested in his possession either by a molestation of law or by a molestation 
of fact which must persist. In Cachia Zammit versus Barbara (1959) -
Volume XLIII.11.822 defendant had molested plaintiff by building a room 
on his land, but which was subsequently demolished. Here, the actio 
manutentionis was not accepted because the very subject matter of molestation, 
that is the room, no longer existed. This seems to be similar to Italy where 
Torrente says: 
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"Spetta dunque, alla parte, che lamenta di essere stata molestata, di 
specificare in che cosa consista la molestia sofferta, essendo evidente che 
la domanda di manutenzione o di remissione in pristino, anche se formulata 
in termini piu ampi, non puo essere accolta senza un preciso riferimento 
alla molestia indicata ed ai suoi effetti preguidizievoli all' esercizio del 
possesso, che devono appunto essere eliminati da chi se ne sia reso 
responsabile''. 
A molestation of law is based on a claim of right of another person contrary 
to the possessor's possession, whether such allegation is made judicially or extra­
judicially and whether the molestor is claiming in his favour or not. A 
molestation of fact has been interpreted very widely, including also spoliation 
which is the greatest violation against possession. The meaning of molestation 
was elaborated upon in Vella versus �oldarini et cited before, "MolestNion, 
whether of fact or of law, always implies the 'contradictio' to possession, 
of whatever nature. It manifests itself externally in an act, made against 
the possessor's will, accomplished with the 'animus contrarius'. · The 
molestor acts against the possession, he hinders the possession or changes 
the enjoyment, without the molestor necessarily affirming for himself a 
contrary possession". 
This element is not similar to that found under the actio spolii which 
mentions only violent or clandestine spoliation. In Mifsud versus Cassar (1943) 
- Volume XXXI.1.296 the Court of Appeal confirmed this:
"L-azzjoni ta' spoil ..... bazat fuq il-konsiderazzjoni ta' ordni 
pubbliku illi dak Ii jigi spoljat vjolentement, jew klandestinament, ghandu 
jigi difiz mit-tribunali, u min ikun ghamel dak 1-ispoll ma jkunx jista' jgib 
ebda difiza". 
As regards the actio manutentionis the court continued: 
"Tista' tkun ezercitata anki f'kaz ta' spoil Ii ma jkunx vjolenti jtw 
klandestin" whereas under the actio spolii, "dik il-molestija jew spoil trid 
tkun permezz ta' vjolenza jew klandestinita". 
As to the term 'violence' under the actio spolii, it is enough' that violence 
is exerted on the thing itself. In Zahra versus Carabott, mentioned earlier, 
the Court of Appeal in fact said: 
"Sabiex jigi sodisfatt dan ir-rekwizit, ma hemmx bzonn il-'vis atro' 
cioe xi vjolenza fizika jew morali fuq il-persuna tal-possessur, imma 
bizzejjed, il-vjolenza fuq il-haga". 
Therefore molestation of fact may amount to private force against the will 
of the possessor, being physical or moral violence against the person of the 
possessor, or violence against the thing itself such as displacement of boundary 
marks, or even clandestine spoliation which is carried into effect without the 
knowledge of the possessor. 
However in Agius versus Gauci (1923) - Volume XXV.11.220, the 
court did not accept that a wall built to stop one from passing was a molestation, 
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because the plaintiff used to be allowed to pass only on tolerance and therefore 
he could have been stopped any time. This reasoning appears to apply also 
to the actio spolii as upheld in Pace versus Cilia (1966): 
M'hemmx possess guridikament reintengrabbli fejn il-vantagg 
gawdent mill-pretiz spoljat jistrieh fuq is-semplici tolleranza tal-pretiz 
spoljatur . . . . . jehtieg Ii din it-tolleranza tirrizulta prontament, cioe 
minghajr il-htiega ta' indagini inoltrata". 
Torrente says: 
"Alla nozione di molestia non e, pertanto, inerente l'esistenza di un 
danno attuale, essendo sufficiente che lo stato di possesso sia posto in dubbio 
o in pericolo, perche ii soggetto passivo della molestia sia legittimato a
chiedere la tutela possessoria''. Molestation · can exist also as between
co-possessors where Torrente continues, "in tema di compossesso si verifica
molestia allorche uno dei compossessori, ampliando la sfera del proprio
possesso, renda piu incomodo o restringa, a proprio vantaggio, ii precedente
modo di esercizio del possesso dell'altro o dagli altri compossessori''.
The will to molest, }'animus turbandi, exists in the voluntariness of 
molesting, that is, with the knowledge that what one is doing is in some way 
changing the state of fact that exists. Here, Torrente says: 
"L'animus turbandi consiste nella volontarieta del fatto, compiuto 
a detrimento dell'altriu possesso, nella consapevolezza e nella coscienza 
di contraddire, modificare o limitare l'esercizio del diritto del possessore 
contro la volonta espressa o presenta di costui. La volontarieta della 
turbativa, quale elemento essenziale della molestia possessoria, ai fini 
dell'azione di manutenzione, e normalmente insita nello stesso volontario 
compimento di un atto che modifichi o alteri lo stato preesistente dell'altrui 
posses so''. 
The last element is the time limit. The period of one year from 
molestation applicable to the plaintiff to make the action existed also in Roman 
Law. It is rather short because the protection given by law, of a state of fact 
may perhaps be contrary to law. After one year, this action cannot be instituted, 
sm·ing perhaps an action on the merits, the actio petitoria, wherein, the plaintiff 
\\'ho was molested has to prove the right claimed by him, that is for example, 
that he is the owner. Galgano says, "trascorso l'anno, ii possesso si consolida 
nelle mani dell' autore dello spoglio, e la restituzione della cosa potra essere 
ottenuta, con l'azione di rivendicazione, solo da chi si dimostri 
proprietario". Under the actio spolii, the time limit is even more rigid, because 
it can only be exercised within two months from the spoliation. 
The limitation that the plaintif
f 
must have possessed for one year, which 
l'xists in France and Italy was not included by Sir A. Dingli, because this did 
not exist under Roman Law. Torrente says that possession must not have been 
acquired \·iolently or clandestinely. In such cases, the actio manutentionis can 
only be exercised after one year from when the violence or clandestinity cease. 
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This is similar to the presumption under Section 527 with the exception of the 
applicability of the one year duration of possession. As regards repeateq, 
molestations Torrente, quoting from a court judgment says, "in presenza. di 
piu atti successivi di turbativa, ii termine di un anno per la proposizione 
dell'azione di manutenzione deve essere computato dall'atto iniziale, se 
si tratti di atti collegati obiettivamente tra loro, mentre computato 
dall'ultimo, quando le turbative siano discontinue ed autonome''. 
Although Section 534 says, "demand that his possession be retained", 
the purpose of the actio manutentionis is both of a conservative function, and 
also of a recuperative function, in either bringing the molestation to· an end 
if the molested perso9 is still in _possession or in giving back to him that 
possession of which he has been deprived. A characteristic common to possessory 
actions is that they all tend to obtain the maintenance of a 'status quo' to protect 
public order. They are� sort of a transitory judgment, paving the way for a 
definitive judgment in favour of the owner when he exercises his rights under 
the actiones petitoriae. Questions of ownership or other rights are not 
prejudiced, so that possessory actions have the effect of defining the position 
of the parties in an actio petitoria in whkh the plaintiff is the one who lost 
the possession, in such a way that the onus probandi rests on him, to prove 
his rights. I will conclude by quoting Galgano: 
"Nei confronti �el proprietario, la protezione del possessorio e solo 
provvisoria: vinto ii giudizio possessario e ottenuta la restituzione della 
cosa, ii possessore soccombera nel successivo giudizio petitorio, e dovra 
definittivamente consegnarla al proprietario' '. 
The author, Paul Debono Dip.Not.Pub. is a fifth year law student at the University of Malta. 
